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DELIMITATION OF MARINE AND
SUBMARINE AREAS:
THE GULF OF VENEZUELA
MARY JEANNE REID MARTZ*
INTRODUCTION
Among Latin American nations with common border and other
problems, Venezuela and Colombia enjoy relatively amicable relations.
This is due partially to historical and cultural affinities. It is, however,
also a result of the efforts of governmental elites in both countries to
calm tendencies toward xenophobic nationalism on the part of the two
populaces. Nevertheless, the border dispute in the Gulf of Venezuela rep-
resents only one of the potentially hypersensitive areas in Venezuelan-
Colombian relations. Of almost commensurate importance is the question
of Colombians illegally crossing the border into economically more pro-
ductive Venezuela. Without the proper documentation, they are classified
as indocumentados. Of lesser import is the flourishing contraband industry
whose goods (primarily cattle) make their way clandestinely from Colom-
bia to Venezuela. The purpose of this article is to explore the arena of
legal issues surrounding the Colombia-Venezuela boundary controversy.
After scrutinizing the details of the dispute, I will briefly probe the
negotiations which, since 1967, have failed to produce a mutually accept-
able and equitable settlement.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE BASES TO THE DISPUTE
The Gulf of Venezuela has a shoreline almost entirely within Vene-
zuela. The Gulf stretches between the Guajira and Paraguani peninsulas,
varying between fifty and one hundred miles at its entrance and reach-
*Ph.D., Duke University; M.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill;
B.S., Georgetown College (Kentucky). The author is currently an Assistant Professor
of Political Science at Clemson University, South Carolina. She is indebted to The
American Philosophical Society Penrose Fund for a grant which made the research
for this article possible.
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ing a maximum width of one hundred and twenty miles. What is at
issue is not the land frontier of the Gulf but rather the ownership of the
marine and submarine areas. The points at issue have become shrouded
in the cloak of secrecy which has surrounded the Colombia-Venezuela
negotiations in the last ten years.1 Most of the citizens in both countries
have little knowledge of the nature of the dispute and of the negotiations.
Many politicians outside of the major party elites are similarly lacking
in understanding. As a result, the press of the two neighbors has ac-
cused both governments of incompetence.
The Venezuelan claim to the Gulf of Venezuela is founded upon
numerous historical, geographic and economic factors. Venezuelan poli-
ticians, historians, and geographers all base their country's ownership
on continuous sovereignty exercised for four hundred years.2 They con-
tend that prior to 1833 the entire Gulf was surrounded by Venezuelan
territory, and that the Gulf itself virtually constituted an historical inland
sea. Moreover, Venezuelans have contended that, historically, Colombia
had paid scant attention to the arid and sparsely inhabited peninsula
of Guajira. It was only in the 1960's, when possibilities for oil exploita-
tion were raised, that Colombia became interested in the region.
Geographically, the Gulf of Venezuela has been considered vital to
Venezuelan national interests. The Gulf is traversed by the navigational
channel which connects Venezuela's second largest city, Maracaibo, to
the Caribbean. It is also a part of a hydrographic communications route
extending to the edge of the Andes. It is of essential strategic economic
importance, representing the only navigational means by which petroleum
from oil-rich Lake Maracaibo can be cheaply carried by tanker to the
exterior. Moreover, the Gulf contains Venezuela's most important petro-
leum and natural gas deposits. For no other country, including Colombia,
is the Gulf such an important transit area.
Obviously the crux of the matter is economics. Venezuela needs un-
impeded access from Lake Maracaibo to the Caribbean to keep down oil
transportation costs and, though there may be no danger of Colombia
deliberately closing off the number one pilotage channel, there remains
the possibility that oil exploitation and the erection of installations in the
area might result in sedimentation and obstruction of the channel. Com-
IFour years ago, when the Venezuelan Caldera administration briefed the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on the dispute, it was done in total secrecy. Interview
with a former member of the Committee (July 5, 1975).
2See e.g., M. Paul, Caso del Golfo de Venezuela.
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plicating this conflict is the fact that there appear to be signifcant oil
deposits in the continental platform. Studies dating from 1968 by the
Corporaci6n Venezolana de Petroleo (CVP) and Ecopetrol" of Colombia
have indicated the existence of petroleum. Moreover, it is true that hydro-
carbon specialists have participated in the negotiations in recent years.'
While Venezuela's oil reserves are declining slowly, Colombia's production
dropped precipitously from 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1970 to
156,000 bpd by 1975. Until recently Colombia had to import 20,000 bpd
to meet domestic needs. 4
Easily one of the most significant technological advances affecting
the law of the sea since World War II (excluding military instruments
or operations) is considered to be the expanded use and rapid extension
of offshore oil exploration and exploitation. The increased cost of pros-
pecting for and extracting petroleum from submarine areas has proven
to be more than equaled by the substantial profits thus far gained from
such activities. Further, existing geological studies show the existence of
large reserves of carbon, platinum, magnesium, precious stones and radio-
active elements in the Gulf. 5 While Colombia has claimed that the problem
is juridical, Venezuela has accused Colombia of attempting to "petrolize"
the question and has treated the issue as primarily territorial rather than
economic.6
Colombia cites the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
as the legal basis for her claims over the continental shelf. Colombia
argues that Venezuela's reservation to the Convention specifically excepts
such criteria and reserves the right to make special arrangements and
negotiations for the demarcation. Venezuela meets this argument by citing
the decision of the International Court of Justice in the 1969 North Sea
Cases. Both of these legal arguments will be discussed below.
3flesumen (Caracas), June 9, 1974, § III, at 12. It was reported in 1974 that
there were large natural gas deposits in the Colombian Guajira. Latin American
Economic Report (Great Britain), November 22, 1974, § II, at 181. In 1971 the
Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Petroleum indicated that studies had been made
which show the Gulf favorable for the discovery of oil. El Nacional (Caracas),
May 3, 1971, at D-1.
4Latin America (Great Britain), October 24, 1975, § IX, at 334.
5See the statement by the Colombian geologist Dr. Llinas Pimienta in Latin
America, June 26, 1970, § IV, at 205.
6R. Leoni, Posici6n de Venezuela ante Colombia (1971), at 49.
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THE HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
While the Colombia-Venezuela boundary dispute has come to the
fore during the contemporary democratic era, its roots extend far back
into history. Following the Wars of Independence and the 1830 dissolu-
tion of Gran Colombia, the Michelena-Pombo Treaty of 1833 recognized
El Cabo de la Vela (located at the head of the Guajira peninsula), as the
point at which the northern part of the Colombia-Venezuela boundary
would begin. The treaty, based on earlier explorations and Spanish maps
of the area, in effect acknowledged Venezuela's possession of the greater
part of the Guajira peninsula. At the time, Colombia was amenable to
the arrangement because of internal political difficulties resulting from a
frontier dispute with Ecuador. The treaty was ratified by Colombia and
then, for unexplained reasons, was subsequently rejected by the legislature
of Venezuela. Ruben Carpio Castillo, a prominent Venezuelan geographer
and former deputy of the National Congress, writes that the earlier con-
gress "demonstrated a crass historical ignorance and a lack of geographi.
cal conscience and of Bolivarian judgement. This scandalous demonstra-
tion of ignorance on the part of Congress was prejudicial to the interests
of our country."'7 In 1973, presidential candidate Carlos Andr6s Prez
would similarly speak of the "irresponsibility" of previous generations of
Venezuelans.2
The failure to effect a treaty relegated the controversy to a state
of limbo for fifty years. It resurfaced again in 1884 when the two coun-
tries agreed to arbitration. In 1891 the Princess Regent of Spain, Mariana
Cristiana, delivered an award placing the boundary, not at El Cabo de
la Vela but, rather, at the "Mogotes de los Frailes," a point which could
not be located with precision.
In 1901 a Mixed Border Commission opted for the parallel of the
Castilletes as the eastern marker of the land boundary. This decision also
failed to produce a formal agreement, causing the matter to be referred
to arbitration again in 1916. The arbitrator, the Swiss Confederation,
rendered a judgment in 1922 ratifying the 1891 arbitration without locat.
ing the "Mogotes de los Frailes." Not until 1941 was the dispute subject
to another decision. In 1941 the treaty of Santos-L6pez Contreras on
border demarcation and the navigation of common rivers was signed and
. 7R. Castillo, El Golfo de Venezuela: Mar Territorial y Plataforma Continental
(1971), at 68.
sInterview with Carlos Andris Pirez in Resumen, November 25, 1973, § I, at 7.
GULF OF VENEZUELA
ratified by both Venezuela and Colombia. It was hardly a popular treaty
in Caracas, for Venezuela thereby ceded some 5,000 kilometers of the
Guajira peninsula. While the geographical coordinate of the Castilletes
forms the basis of negotiations today, the 1941 Treaty made no mention
of rights over marine and submarine areas.
SUGGESTED MEANS FOR DELIMITING THE MARINE AND SUBMARINE AREAS
Two main issues relative to the Colombia-Venezuela dispute have
gradually emerged: the territorial sea, and the submarine areas of the
continental shelf. Colombia has a Gulf coast and, by virtue of that
coast, a territorial sea, according to the 1941 Treaty. The terrestial frontier
provides the point of departure for the delimitation of the territorial sea
and marine and submarine areas. It does not, however, resolve the course
of the extension of this boundary line into the waters of the gulf, not
only for the twelve mile territorial sea limit to which both countries
ascribe,9 but also for the delimitation of the continental shelf.
Colombia has maintained that the method of delimiting the territorial
sea, marine and submarine areas, and continental shelf in the Gulf should
be the median line drawn according to the so-called Boggs procedure.
S. Whittemore Boggs, in 1951 a Special Advisor on Geography to the
United States (U.S.) Department of State, wrote that one should:
Lay down any lateral jurisdiction limit or boundary, first through
the territorial sea by a single straight line (except where islands
make it unfeasible) from the low-water-datum terminous of the land
boundary out to the point of intersection of the envelopes of arcs of
circles of 3 mile (or territorial sea width) radius from the coasts of
the two states.
In extending a lateral jurisdictional limit through a 'contiguous
zone' out to any desired distance (beginning at the outer limit of the
territorial sea), it may be laid down either on the 'median line'
principle (every point being equidistant from the nearest point or
points on opposite shores) or as a series of straight lines connecting
points of intersections of successive envelopes of arcs of radii, increas-
ing by increments of three miles (or any other accepted unit) mea-
9For Venezuela see Gaceta oficial, No. 496, Extraordinario del 17 de agosto
1956; also, the Constitution in Gaceta oficial, 23 de enero 1961. For Colombia
see Article S0 of Decreto legislativo, No. 3183, 20 de diciembre 1952.
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sured from the nearest points on opposite shores-that is, from the
intersection of the low-water-datum plane with the coast. 0
Thus, the equidistance line leaves to a coastal state "all those portions
of the continental shelf that are nearer to a point on its own coasts than
they are to any point on the coast of" the adjacent coastal state.1 Specifi-
cally, Boggs applied his theory to the Gulf of Venezuela, both to the
extension of the territorial frontier of the Guajira peninsula, and to the
boundary between the Colombian Guajira and the Venezuelan Paraguand
peninsulas.' 2
To the contrary, however, Venezuela has claimed that the method
for drawing the marine boundary should be that of the prolongation of
the territorial frontier. An equidistant line would divide the water roughly
equally for states with straight or nearly straight coastlines. In other cases,
such as the Gulf of Venezuela, an equidistant line would disproportionately
favor one party-in this case Colombia. 3
Under Article 12 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone the equidistant line is accepted:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each
other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between
them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median
line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each
of the two States is measured. The provisions of this paragraph shall
not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title
or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the
two States in a way which is at variance with this provision.
t4
t0Boggs, Delimitation of Seaward Areas Under National Jurisdiction, XIV Am.
J. Int'l L. 265 (1951).
tiThe North Sea Cases, [1969] I.CJ. 18.
12 See map in Boggs, supra note 10, at 261.
13The ICJ in the North Sea Cases points out the inequity extant in certain
cases:
The slightest irregularity in a coastline is automatically magnified by the
equidistance line as regards the consequences for the delimitation of the con-
tinental shelf. Thus it has been seen in the case of concave or convex coastlines
that if the equidistance method is employed, then the greater the irregularity
and the further from the coastline the area delimited, the more unreasonable
are the results produced. So great an exaggeration of the consequences of a
natural geographic feature must be remedied or compensated for as far as
possible, being of itself creative of inequality. [1969] I.C.J. 50.
14515 U.N.T.S. 205.
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Venezuela made a reservation to this article because "neither the case of
equidistance lines nor their variants are applicable since the Gulf of
Venezuela is a bay that presents special circumstances."' S
A critical area concerning the territorial sea is the division of the
waters north of the parallel of Castilletes between the northern Guajira
peninsula and the Venezuelan Los Monjes islets. Measured from the
nethermost point at low tide, the distance between the Colombian coast
and the islets is only eighteen to nineteen miles. The continental shelf of
the coast slopes more than that of the islets, and the irregularities, to be
taken into account in establishing a base line, are more pronounced on
the Guajira peninsula than in Los Monjes." The reason for the dispute
over this area is that each country has a twelve mile territorial sea claim
and there is an overlap of some five miles in the respective claims.
The critical area for the last ten years of controversy has revolved about
the sovereignty over the submarine areas of the continental shelf south of
the parallel of Castilletes, and between the Colombian Guajira peninsula
and the Los Monjes islets. 17 Some Colombian nationalists have also alleged
that their nation has sovereignty over the Los Monjes archipelago." In
a diplomatic note of November 22, 1952, the Colombian Foreign Minister,
Juan Uribe Holguin, recognized Venezuela's sovereignty over Los Monjes:
The government of Colombia declares that it does not object to the
sovereignty of the United States of Venezuela [now called the Repub-
lic of Venezuela] over the archipelago of Los Monjes and that, in
lt Venezuela, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Libro amarillo, separata 1969
(1970), at XLII. Strictly speaking the rule of the equidistance line is not the same
as the median line. "A true median line presupposes a line which is in the middle.
Theoretically, at least, a boundary line through the territorial sea between two ad-
jacent states, while an equidistant line is not a true median line." Grisel, The
Lateral Boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the Judgment of the International
Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, LXIV Am.J. Int'l L. 574
(1970), quoting A. Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries (1962), at 231. See also
[1969] L.CJ. 17, 37-38. In a dissenting opinion, however, Judge Sorensen claims
that the distinction is fictitious as substantiated by the proceedings of the Geneva
Conference, [19691 I.C.J. 251.
16C. Castillo, El Golfo de Venezuela, at 82.
17A reference by Colombian President L6pez Michelsen in 1974 to the "so-
called" Gulf of Venezuela brought angry protestations in the Venezuelan press that
the substantial part of the Gulf was not in question as it represented "historic
waters." Resumen, August 4, 1974, § III, at 2.
ItOne basis for the allegations is that the archipelago is more proximate to the
Guajira peninsula than to the Venezuelan coast. This particular argument is specious
in that it would mean that Colombia's Caribbean islands of San Andris and Provi-
dencia should belong to Nicaragua, not to Colombia.
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consequence, is not opposed nor has any claim to formulate for the
exercise of that or any act of dominion on the part of that country
over the archipelago in reference.19
It should, however, be noted that no reference was made in the note to
rights over the continental shelf. In August 1971, there was a debate on
the issue in the Colombian Senate.20 Many Colombian legal experts
contend that it is unconstitutional to change boundaries without the con-
sent of the Congress. Thus, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a treaty opposed to the constitution of a signatory country can
be considered null and void under certain circumstances. Others say that
the Colombian constitution refers only to the 'cession" of territory and
not to the recognition of the rights of others. No claim to Los Monies has
been made by the Colombian government and Venezuela denies the ne-
gotiability of her sovereignty over them.
Neither the territorial sea, contiguous zone or patrimonial sea of
Los Monies nor its ownership is presently at issue.
21
Under consideration now is the delimitation of the marine and sub-
marine areas in the Gulf. The depth of the continental shelf is not dis-
puted, since the maximum depth is only some seventy to seventy-five
meters. Even the traditionally accepted depth for the continental shelf
has been considered to be at least two hundred meters.
Los Monjes arise from the continental shelf, are not submerged at
high tide, and thus conform to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea definition of an island as "a naturally-formed area of
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide." 22
Venezuela contends that as islands they have a continental shelf under
the terms of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, which
states that the term continental shelf refers: "(b) to the seabed and
subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands." 23
19For the complete text of the note see Cisar Moyana Bonilla y Ernesto Visquez
Rocha, Los Monies y las Bahias Hist6ricas Ante el Derecho Internacional (1971),
at 84-27.
20See Hernando Holguin Pelhez, Los Monies: Enjuiciamiento de una Traici6n
1499-1975 (1975), at 303-342.
211nterview with a member of the Venezuelan Congressional Foreign Relations




Colombia, on the other hand, denies that Los Monies have a continental
shelf. Colombia argues that Los Monjes are not islands, but rather rocks
or keys, being totally devoid of plant or animal life.24
Colombian negotiators have insisted that an equidistant or median
line be drawn on the continental platform between the continental coast-
lines of the two neighbors-i.e., between the Guajira and Paraguan
peninsulas--disregarding the islets.
Venezuela claims that the equidistant or median line should be drawn
between Los Monies and the Colombian Guajira. Wittemore Boggs pro-
posed an alternate jurisdictional equidistant line between the Guajira
and Los Monjes--"assuming that the two countries were to agree to
take the Monks Islands into account."1
2
THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION
Colombia supports her position by referring to the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf. Article 6(1) deals with continental
shelves which are adjacent to the territories of two or more states whose
coasts are opposite each other.
In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary is -the median line,
every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each
State is measured.
2 6
Article 6(2) applies the principle of equidistance to the delimita-
tion of lateral boundaries between adjacent states.27
In the absence of agreement, and unless another line is justified by
special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by applica-
24E1 Universal (Caracas), July 10, 1975, at 1-6. Colombia, however, claims a
continental platform for the sandbanks and islets of Roncador, Quita Suenos and
Serrana. C. Castillo, El Golfo de Venezuela, at 90.
Z5 Boggs. Delimitation of Seaward Areas, supra note 10, at 261.
26499 U.N.T.S. 311.
27The term "lateral" was first used by the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. [1969] I.C.J. 18.
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tion of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state
is measured. 28
Using this article for legal support, Colombia contends that the lateral
boundary of the continental shelf (where Venezuela and Colombia ad.
join one another on the Guajira peninsula) should be the Boggs equi-
distant line rather than the extension of the terrestial boundary.
Venezuela, however, while being the only Latin American state to
have signed and ratified all four of the 1958 Geneva Conventions, ex-
cepted to the criteria in Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf and reserved the right to negotiate for special circumstances?29
Under a Venezuelan proposal, Article 6 would have read:
1. Where a continental shelf is adjacent to the territory of two or
more states whose coasts are opposite to each other, the boundary
of the continental shelf appertaining to such states shall be deter-
mined by agreement between them or by other means recognized
in International Law.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territory of
two adjacent states, the boundary shall be determined in the manner
prescribed in paragraph I of this article.30
The Venezuelan representative argued that "bilateral agreements could
take account of special conditions obtaining in any given case and would
provide a more practical solution."'3' Further, at the thirty-second meet-
ing of the Fourth Commission on the Continental Shelf, Venezuelan geolo-
gist and mining engineer Armando Schwarck Arglade contended that
"cases in which the median line would offer the best solution were likely
to arise less frequently than any others, so that exceptions would be
more numerous than the cases covered by the general rule."'3 2
28499 U.N.T.S. 311.
29Venezuela, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Libro amarillo, separata, 1969,
at XLII.
30UN Doc. A/CONF 13/C.4/L 42, at 138.
3UN Doc. A/CONE. 13/42, para. 25, at 21.
32UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/42, para. 9, at 94.
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THE NORTH SEA CASES
Venezuela now claims that the action of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in the 1969 North Sea Cases vindicates Venezuela's po-
sition.3 3 The Court held (eleven to six) that the equidistance principle
was not "an inescapable . . . a priori accompaniment of basic continental
shelf doctrine."34 In 1958, the doctrine had been "purely conventional"
and had not since become binding custom.3 5 Finding no applicable rule
of customary international law for this type of demarcation, the Court
decided that delimitation should be effected through "agreement" in ac-
cordance with "equitable" principles. Rejecting a single method for use
in all circumstances, the ICJ prescribed that the applicable standard
should be the application of methods guaranteeing an equitable outcome.
"There is no legal limit to the considerations which states may take ac-
count of for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable pro-
cedures...""6 The weight to he given to different facts would there-
fore vary with the circumstances of the case. Venezuela has contended
that she would have her continental shelf mutilated by a strict applica-
tion of the geometrical course of the equidistant line.
Colombian geographers and lawyers deny the similarity between the
coastal area off the Republic of Germany and that in the Gulf of Vene-
zuela, pointing out the exceptional configuration of the former. The ap-
plication of the equidistance principle would have produced "a true
amputation" of the platform of Germany. It is further noted that Colom-
bia and Venezuela are bordering nations while Denmark and the Low
Countries are not. Also, Germany had not ratified the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention as Venezuela had.3
Pursuant to her position on the Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea
Conventions, Venezuela failed to sign the Optional Protocol of Signature
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes in 1958,11 while
33The claim is made with regard to the case of both sections (1) and (2) of




36[1969] I.C.J. 50. Although the continental shelf as a doctrine has been in
existence only since 1945, the Ia in this case simply assumed that it had become a
part of general customary law.
37E. Zuleta Angel, El Llamado Golfo de Venezuela, (1971).
38450 U.N.T.S. 169.
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Colombia reserved obligations under previous conventions for the settle-
ment of disputes. Also, because of this position, Venezuela was the only
coastal Latin American state to vote against the Lima Declaration at the
August 1970 regional conference on the law of the sea. The Caracas
government rejected the Declaration on the grounds of Article 2, which
asserted the right of each riparian state to establish the limits of its
maritime sovereignty or jurisdiction according to reasonable criteria.
Venezuela refused to admit any extension of the territorial sea that
might diminish or affect rights of free navigation or rights that Vene-
zuela enjoyed in seas adjacent to her territory. 9
OVERVIEW
It should be noted that both countries' positions regarding the con-
tinental shelf are merely affirmations and not sovereign legal rights. The
controversial North Sea Cases establish that there is no rule of inter-
national law in this area. Moreover, the equidistant lateral line is only
part of Venezuela's claim. Venezuela contends that the 1941 treaty
established the geographical coordinate of the Castilletes parallel, and thus
the dividing line cannot project to the south of that point as Colombia
claims. Under the terms of the present negotiations, Venezuela has indi-
cated that she is not disposed to discuss her sovereignty south of the
parallel. With the zone under current discussion lying to the north of the
parallel, it does not include all Colombian aspirations.
Also related to the issue of the delimitation of submarine areas is the
1942 Gulf of Paria Treaty signed by Venezuela and Great Britain. Con-
cerned with the shallow area of the high seas between the Venezuelan
peninsula of Paria and the then British-owned island of Trinidad, that
treaty was the first to deal with the delimitation of the submarine areas
"of the seabed and of the subsoil outside of the territorial waters" of
the contracting parties. 4" There has been an occasional allusion in the
Colombian press that the principle applied in the 1942 Treaty was the
equidistant method and should therefore be applied in the Gulf of Vene-
39EI Universal, August 4, 1970, at I-1.
40Venezuela, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Tratados p6blicos y acuerdos
internacionales de Venezuela, 1937-1942 (1942), § VI, at 720.
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zuela.41 In fact, however, there is no mention within the Gulf of Paria
Treaty of any method of delimitation being used. This appears to be con-
sistent with Venezuela's current position that the only "method" for de-
limiting submarine areas is direct bilateral negotiations.
THE COURSE OF CONTEMPORARY NEGOTIATIONS
The actual course of the current controversy dates only from the
1960's, when the Colombian government initiated oil exploration measures
in the Gulf. Following protests by the government in Caracas and initial
contacts in 1965 and 1966, exploratory discussions were begun in late
1967 by a Mixed Colombian-Venezuelan Commission. Nevertheless, it was
not until January 19, 1971 that President Rafael Caldera made the first
public announcement of the official Venezuelan position. He clearly
stated it to be "that of a dividing line between the Colombian coast of
Guajira and the Venezuelan islets of Los Monjes, combined with a line of
demarcation that follows the direction of the terrestial frontier because
the areas understood between the Venezuelan coasts are traditional and
historic Venezuelan waters."43  The historic waters thesis has been
countered by the Colombian contention that international law does not
recognize the existence of historic waters in cases where there is a
dispute over sovereignty.44 It is of interest to note that the Venezuelan
delegate (Dr. Carmona) to the First Committee of the 1958 Geneva Law
of the Sea Conference defended the rights of third world countries to
bays and gulfs in declaring:
It [the Venezuelan government] could not, however, view with in-
difference the position of countries which needed to protect their
rights in bays or gulfs not at present of a historic character: Why
41While admitting that the land beneath the Gulf of Paria is not properly a
part of the continental shelf, Arthur Dean, chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the
1958 and 1960 Geneva Law of the Sea Conferences, claims that the principle of
equidistance was employed in the 1942 Treaty. The Law of the Sea: Offshore
Boundaries and Zones (L. Alexander 1967), at 250. On the other hand, the emi-
nent Latin American international legal publicist F. V. Garcia Amador concludes
that the Gulf of Paria submarine areas were delimited by the conventional means of
direct negotiations. F. V. Garcia Amador y Rodriguez, The Exploitation and Con-
servation of the Resources of the Sea; A Study of Contemporary International Law(1963), at 115.
42E1 Universal, January 20, 1971, at I-1. For an authoritative statement of
Colombia's position by then Colombian Foreign Minister Alfredo Visquez Carrizosa
see El Universal, January 18, 1971, at I-I.
43See article by Daniel Samper Pizano in El Tiempo (Bogoti), February 14,
1971, at 6.
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should historic rights prevail in International Law? Venezuela could
never accept the thesis that rights could be acquired by occupation
in international matters. There should be no recognition of a pre-
scriptive title to the detriment of new countries now in full process
of development."
After 1967, talks remained relatively unofficial at the technical and
diplomatic level until the joint Declaration of Sochagota in August 196945
led to a modus operandi for formal negotiations in March 1970.46
Discussions continued at the commission level in Rome until they
were broken off in March 1973, while the press in both countries en-
couraged emotional nationalism over the dispute with announcements of
an arms buildup between the two neighbors. Colombia suggested the
entry into negotiations of a third party, such as the International Court of
Justice or the United Nations, but this idea was rejected by Venezuela.
Meanwhile, the respective governments attempted to allay fears and dull
the thrust of press accusations, yet by October of 1971 there were genuine
fears of war.47 Exaggerated charges and countercharges continued to ap-
pear from the mass media throughout 1972, despite the establishment in
1971 of a mixed Commission to study the entire range of relations between
the two countries.
The Rome talks (terminated in early 1973 without progress) have
been characterized by a former Venezuelan foreign minister as only "ex-
ploratory."4 8 While Colombia called for arbitration (preferably by the
ICJ), Venezuela argued for bilateral negotiations at the foreign minister
level. 49 An agreement in July 1973 to reopen direct negotiations, together
with Venezuela's formal entry into the Andean Pact in the fall of the same
year, appeared to promise possible resolution of the controversy. With
the inauguration in March 1974 of the present Democratic Action (AD)
administration of President Carlos Andr~s Prez in Venezuela, discussions
were transferred from the diplomatic to the highest decision-making level.
44UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/39, para. 37, at 23.
4 5Venezuela, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Libro amarillo, 1969, at 35-37;
see also Venezuela, Presidencia, El primer mensaje del presidente de las Repiblica
Dr. Rafael Caldera al Congreso Nacional, 11 de marzo de 1970, at 45.
4 6Venezuela, Presidencia, El segundo mensaje de Caldera, 1971, at 279.
47 Text of the communique in El Universal, December 20, 1971, at 1-10.
48Interview, supra, note 21.
49EI Tiempo (Bogoti), February 12, 1971, at 1.
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Recently, Colombian ex-President Misael Pastrana Borrero announced
that in July 1973 negotiators had been at the point of signing a com-
prehensive agreement when domestic political problems intervened.50 In
fact, however, for more than four years there have been continuous
reports that an agreement was imminent.
The August 1974 election of Alfonso L6pez Michelsen to the Colom-
bian presidency was interpreted by many as another auspicious sign since
he and President P~rez of Venezuela share a lengthy and warm friendship.
It was widely reported that a settlement was pending, when approximately
five hundred retired Venezuelan officers issued a manifesto in October
1974 rejecting any concession by Venezuela in the controversy. 5' While
the action was unanimously denounced by Venezuelan political parties, the
document definitely dampened negotiations. Although Venezuela is a func-
tioning democracy with little danger of a coup d'etat, the military still
represents a potent force in Venezuelan politics. Moreover, the armed
forces in both countries have taken a particular interest in the border
dispute.
In what was considered a surprise move, President L6pez Michelsen
proposed to the Colombian Congress on July 20, 1975 a joint condominium
over the Gulf of Venezuela. Terming the 1970's the decade of the sea, and
perhaps attempting to seize the initiative, he asked:
Why not think and declare at once, in the face of the world, that in
accord with an old Venezuelan aspiration, the Gulf of Venezuela is an
historic bay, condominium of the two riparian states, Colombia and
Venezuela? In this way we would substitute the confrontation between
our two countries, while ships of other flags fish in the region, for an
affirmation of our common interests, . . . The delimitation of the areas,
in proportion to our respective perimeters, would come in addition. 52
He concluded by saying that Colombia's position as a riparian state means
that it cannot be excluded from the northern part of the Gulf.
This represented the first such proposal at the official level. No men-
tion was made in the speech of joint exploitation, as ex-Ambassador to
Venezuela HWctor Charry Samper was quick to point out. Nevertheless, the
President of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Colombian Cham-
ber noted that the formula would open the way to possible co-exploitation. 53
SOLatin America, October 27, 1975, § IX, at 334.
5SResumen, October 27, 1975, § V, at 12.
52E1 Universal, July 21, 1975, at 1-6.
53E1 Universal, July 23, 1975, at 1-6.
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The idea that the two could join in utilizing the riches of the Gulf was not
new, having already been revived in 1973 by the Colombian geologist
Diego Llinas Pimienta. However, at that point it had never been the
subject of an official governmental proposal. Moreover, the Colombian
government had never before admitted that the Gulf might be anyone's
historic waters.
The L6pez proposal is a novel one. The problem seems to lie in the
fact that in private law condominium and delimitation are mutually
exclusive. If the proposal does not contemplate division at any time, the
acceptance of joint condominium over the disputed area would eventually
lead to joint exploitation. Then the question of how to divide the profits
would arise. Moreover, Venezuela's insistence that the area to the south of
the parallel of Castilletes is non-negotiable precludes joint ownership over
an area which Colombia claims to be in dispute. Therefore, if put for-
ward as a substitute for negotiations, the proposal does not appear to be
feasible.
The first official response from the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry did
not deal with the substance of the Lpez proposal. Officials at the United
States Embassy in Caracas were concerned at the Ministry announcement
which noted that:
in the context of the negotiations .. , it would be interesting to con-
sider the closing off of the Gulf of Venezuela within the agreements
the two states may decide. In any case the important initiative of the
Colombian President is not directly related to the delimitation in the
interior of the Gulf over which the conversations between the two
governments will continue.5
4
Closing off the Gulf might subject foreign oil tankers to transit taxes
or other restrictive measures, causing further problems since both the U.S.
and Great Britain consider the Gulf to be international waters. In any
event, the government in Caracas has not accepted the Colombian pro-
posal nor does it seem disposed to do so.
CONCLUSION
Despite the current cordial relations between the administrations in
Colombia and Venezuela, intense nationalistic sentiment in both countries
has not waned and negotiations have been inconclusive. It is often sug-
54Resumen, August 3, 1975, § VIII, at 3.
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gested by moderates in the two nations that joint exploitation would be the
more feasible and probable solution; nevertheless, there appears to be no
official undertaking to draw up such a plan.
It is obviously in the self-interest of these two remaining stable
democracies in South America to seek a resolution of the potentially
dangerous controversy. Both are interested in the maintenance of cordial
relations as a basis for the future development of the Andean Group; the
natural resources lying beneath the Gulf are potentially of great value.
Nevertheless, the timing is not crucial for either. This is especially clear
on the part of Venezuela, where neither governmental nor congressional
elites appear to be pressing for a solution. However, it also holds true for
Colombia, where petroleum production is now on the rise.
Some suggestions have been formulated that the controversial discus-
sions simply be postponed as Venezuela has done with the Guayana border
dispute through the 1971 Port of Spain Protocol. There appears to be
little support for this proposal, however. This is perhaps a result of the fact
that, due to the lack of consensus on the Port of Spain Protocol, the Vene-
zuelan Congress failed either to ratify or to reject that document. 55
There is also some question as to whether the marine and submarine
area issue can be resolved unless a solution can be found for the continuing
flight of Colombian indocumentados and their sometimes subsequent depor-
tation. It also seems clear, at least relative to Venezuela, that the military's
traditional firm defense of national sovereignty has been one reason that
Venezuela has not pressed the issue. While the institutionalization of
democracy seems to be proceeding., prevailing patterns of domestic power
relationships have scarcely been obliterated.
There is little question that there can be no solution fully acceptable
to all Colombians and Venezuelans. According to the International Court
of Justice in the North Sea Cases, there is no firm rule of international
law governing the delimitation of the continental shelf. Thus, neither party
is likely to be totally satisfied with an arrangement that might appear to
be a derogation of sovereign rights. In each country, an international treaty
negotiated by the executive must be ratified by the national legislature. A
resolution to the dispute could provide an interesting precedent for study
with regard to potentially controversial submarine boundaries in other
areas of the world. For the present, however, the prolonged ministerial and
presidential talks have not produced a solution.
5SPresident Caldera in September 1971 denied any analogy between the Colom-
bian and Guayana controversies.
